Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio

The Superintendence of Industry and Commerce (SIC), in its role as National Authority for Competition Protection, imposed fines up to COP $28,434,103,236 on nine (9) companies and sixteen (16) individuals for infringements to the free competition regime and cartelization in the School Snacks Program (PREB, for its acronym in Spanish) of the School Food Program (PAE, for its acronym in Spanish) of Bogotá.

This conduct was carried out between 2007 and 2017.

The SIC also sanctioned the COLOMBIAN ASSOCIATION OF FOOD SUPPLIERS (ASOPROVAL, for its acronym in Spanish) for having developed and implemented a system aimed at limiting free competition in relation to the contractual selection processes of the PREB.

Fines:

The Case:

The SIC was able to prove the existence of an illegal agreement between AERODELICIAS, SERVICIAL, LA CAMPIÑA, CATALINSA, DISERAL, IBEASER, LIBER, SPRESS and SURCOLOMBIANA, whose purpose was to eliminate competition in the contractual selection processes of the PREB, between 2007 and 2017. 

Through this agreement, the offenders distributed the adjudications of the AREAS within the Capital District of Bogotá, dividing the selection processes of the city's School Snacks Program. The sanctioned companies devised and continuously executed a dynamic that affected free competition in nineteen (19) contractual selection processes. This dynamic is summarized below:

• The sanctioned companies coordinated in order to distribute the AREAS to be awarded
• The coordination sought to avoid competition between them when participating for each AREA to be awarded in the different selection processes, which resulted in a significant number of AREAS in which only one bidder was presented. 
• Only in 38.52% of the AREAS more than one proposal was presented. This percentage decreased to 25% when taking into account exclusively the concurrence of proposals that were enabled to compete in each AREA. This meant that in 75% of the AREAS to be awarded there was no plurality of bidders.
• Additionally, within the coordination framework, those sanctioned companies were preventing Bogotá D.C. from modifying the contracting modality to mechanisms that promoted competition. The sanctioned companies used the ASOPROVAL association as a coordination vehicle, in order to maintain the illicit structure of the agreement.
• It was also found that the sanctioned companies maintained close relationships and constant communication during the period investigated, even during the development of the contractual selection processes under investigation.